Recent years have seen increased interest in the question of whether it is possible to provide an evolutionary game theoretic explanation for certain kinds of social norms. I sketch a proof of a general representation theorem for a large class of evolutionary game theoretic models played on a social network, in hope that this will contribute to a greater understanding of the long-term evolutionary dynamics of such models, and hence the evolution of social norms. More precisely, I show how many kinds of social networks can be translated into random boolean networks. The interesting and useful part of this result consists of the demonstration that, for many social networks, there is a bijection † f between the state space of the social network and the state space of the random boolean network, such that the state †
1. Introduction. Recent years have seen increased interest in the question of whether it is possible to provide an evolutionary game theoretic explanation for certain kinds of social norms [see, for example, Skyrms (1994) , Skyrms (1996) , D'Arms et al. (1998) , Alexander and Skyrms (1999) , and Alexander (2000) ]. Those who seek to provide such an account typically proceed as follows: first, one identifies a particular norm of interest --the explanandum --as well as a game representing the choice problem in which that norm is typically invoked. Second, interpreting the evolutionary game theoretic account as a model of cultural evolution, 1 one constructs a model of the process in which boundedly rational individuals interact, learn, and change their beliefs or behaviors. The goal is to demonstrate that the formal strategy or strategies corresponding to the social norm under study exist in some kind of equilibrium under the associated dynamics. If such an equilibrium exists, and the population converges to that equilibrium often enough, it is then argued that this provides, as Skyrms said regarding the concept of justice, "a beginning of an explanation of the origin" of the norm in question (Skyrms, 1994, pg. 320) .
In this kind of explanatory account, it is important to note the respective roles played by (1) the fact that the strategies representing a social norm exist in some kind of equilibrium under the associated dynamics, and (2) the fact that the population converges to that equilibrium "often enough." The first point explains the stability and (perhaps) the normativity attached to that norm: the reason why people continue to follow it is that, once arrived at, that norm provides a reasonably successful solution to the interdependent decision problem at hand, such that no individual can expect to do better by deviating from it.
2 Under the assumption that a person will not deliberately choose to follow a course of action that makes himself or herself worse off than before, the norm is "fixed" in the population since attempts to depart from it are not fruitful and consequently eliminated. 3 The second point explains why, in fact, we actually find ourselves following that norm rather then some other norm. In the ideal case 4 , one finds that the population always arrives at the equilibrium corresponding to the norm we actually follow, no matter how it may have started. In this case it is clear why we find that norm present in society: the dynamics of boundedly rational interaction inevitably drive populations towards adopting that norm.
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In this paper I will not engage the question of whether this explanatory strategy succeeds or fails. My concern here lies with the question of how one establishes the second claim above, namely, that populations converge to certain equilibria "often enough." In general, this is the problem of calculating the basins of attraction for a given dynamical system and of determining their relative size. 6 This question points up an inherent difficulty lying at the heart of the evolutionary game theoretic approach. While one should take the results from a purported evolutionary game theoretic explanation of social norms seriously to the extent that the underlying model accurately represents the relevant aspects of social interaction among members of the population, the construction of a more accurate model often requires rejecting certain simplifying assumptions which facilitate calculating basins of attraction of a given equilibrium. That is, as the empirical adequacy of the evolutionary model increases (thus giving us more reason to take its results seriously), it becomes harder to establish the formal results that underwrite the explanation.
For example, Skyrms (1994) uses the replicator dynamics to develop an evolutionary game theoretic model of a population of boundedly rational individuals playing the game of "divide-the-dollar." In order to justify the use of the replicator dynamics, one must assume (in part) that the population is essentially infinite and perfectly mixed, such that all pairwise interactions are equally likely. These assumptions appear inaccurate for describing real human societies. As D' Arms et al. (1998) note, one finds important differences in the frequencies with which certain equilibria arise when considering a finite population model. In a previous paper, I argued that considering finite populations in which interactions are constrained by an underlying social network also produces interesting differences in the kinds of equilibria which emerge. This illustrates the problem described above. Moving from Skyrms's replicator dynamic model to a finite-population, social network model involves moving from a continuous dynamical system described by a set of differential equations to a discrete dynamical system described by a set of transition rules, and, generally speaking, analyzing discrete systems is a more difficult problem than analyzing continuous systems. If we need to consider finite-population, social network models in order to construct an empirically adequate model of the evolution of social norms, we must improve our ability to determine the basins of attractions of such models. This paper seeks to establish one result which, it is hoped, will contribute to the general solution of this problem. 
The boolean functions are often referred to as transition rules because they fix the state transitions for each node in the network. A random boolean network is essentially a generalized cellular automata, obtained by lifting the assumption that each node has the exact same transition rule and neighborhood.
A social network model consists of a population of agents, each of whom has a particular strategy; a network of relations defined on the population, specifying the set of possible interactions among members; and a set of update rules for each agent, specifying how she switches strategies at the end of each round of play. interacts with her neighbors, playing some game using strategy † s a . At the end of each round of play, an agent's score equals the sum of the payoffs from each pairwise interaction, and each agent has the opportunity to change her strategy. It is assumed that an agent will only elect to change her strategy if she has an appropriate incentive--e.g., if at least one of her neighbors received a higher score than she did. The specific way in which the agent † a chooses a new strategy corresponds to a particular learning rule † L a , which may or may not be the same for all agents.
Since the general proof of the representation theorem consists of showing how, given an arbitrary social network model with a finite number of individual strategies and deterministic update rules, one would go about constructing a RBN having the desired properties, 8 I will first present two examples showing how to construct a RBN whose dynamics and state space are isomorphic to that of a given social network model. I will then consider a case where one cannot construct a RBN whose state space and dynamics are isomorphic to the social network, but where one can construct a RBN in which a representation of the state space and dynamics of the social network is embedded. I then generalize this general procedure (thus sketching the proof). In these examples, I assume agents in the social network employ the following learning rule:
Imitate best neighbor, conservatively.
An agent † a switches strategies if and only if at least one agent in † n(a) received a score higher than † a. The strategy adopted by † a is the strategy closest to her present one, according to some suitable metric.
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As two of the examples are simple two-strategy versions of the prisoner's dilemma and the stag hunt, in these cases this learning rule collapses to: switch strategies if and only if every person receiving the maximum highest score in your neighborhood followed the opposite strategy. 10 Note, though, that nothing regarding the statement or proof of the representation theorem depends upon this particular assumption as to the learning rule--what is crucial is only that there be a nondeterministic update rule specifying how future strategies are selected.
The Prisoner's Dilemma.
Consider a simple network model of the prisoner's dilemma where seven agents play the prisoner's dilemma on a ring and all agents use the "imitate best neighbor, conservatively" update rule as described above. One minor complication occurs because the edges in a social network are undirected whereas the edges in a RBN are directed. The reason for this is simply that in a social network the relations of interaction and updating are symmetric: if † 00000 AE 0
The Stag Hunt.
Consider a social network model in which seven people situated on a ring play the stag hunt with their neighbors, and assume that the specific form of the stag hunt be that of table 3. Constructing a RBN equivalent to this social network would proceed exactly as above, with only two exceptions. First, the on and off states of nodes in the RBN represent the strategies "Hunt stag" and "Hunt rabbit" instead of "Cooperate" and "Defect." Second, the particular transition rules assigned to each node will differ from those for the prisoner's dilemma. Table 4 lists the transitions rule for each node in the resulting RBN. Interestingly, for all of the strategic differences between the prisoner's dilemma and the stag hunt, note the relatively little difference between the two transition rules.
aid in formulating theorems about the basins of attraction for particular social networks. Given that one needs a reasonable amount of data in order to form a conjecture, the ability to catalog basins of attraction for particular social networks allows one to generate, relatively rapidly, data regarding basins of attraction for social networks which was previously difficult to obtain. The appendix to this paper illustrates the complete basins of attraction (up to rotational equivalence) for three different social network models.
Finally, the technique developed by Wuensche and Lesser for displaying the basins of attraction for RBNs raises several interesting questions for future research. For example, how does adding new edges to a social network affect the basin of attraction? Does gradually increasing the number of edges between agents in the population gradually change the shape of the basin of attraction? Is there a critical point at which something akin to a "phase transition" occurs, where a slight change in the number of edges in the network leads to a dramatic change in the basin of attraction? What difference does it make if all agents in the population employ the same learning rule? Since it is possible to automatically map the basins of attraction for RBNs, we can now automatically map the basins of attraction for social networks. Since changes in the basin of attraction correspond to immediately recognizable visible differences in the map (i.e., compare tables 7 and 8, showing the difference in the basin of attraction between the stag hunt and prisoner's dilemma played on a 8-person ring), we can, quite literally, see how changing a social network model changes its basins of attraction. It is hoped that this method of analyzing social networks will lead to the identification of regularities between the nature of social network models and their basins of attraction, and perhaps more.
Appendix A. Basins of attraction. The following figures illustrate complete basins of attraction for random boolean networks equivalent to a social network in which agents play the prisoner's dilemma or the stag hunt. In these figures, a row of squares represents a state of the RBN. Darkly shaded squares represent nodes in the "off" state, lightly shaded squares represent nodes in the "on" state. The interpretation of these nodes depends on the game: for the prisoner's dilemma, "on" and "off" should be read as "cooperate" and "defect," respectively; for the stag hunt, "on" and "off" should be read as "hunt stag" and "hunt rabbit," respectively. In all cases, the topology of the original social network was a ring. The line of squares rearranges the nodes from a ring-shape into a line shape, so the leftmost and rightmost squares are, strictly speaking, adjacent.
The center of each diagram represents a fixed point of the dynamics (for these RBNs, there are no cycles). Given a particular state † S, its successor state † S' is located closer towards the center of the diagram; a single evolutionary trajectory thus begins from the initial state and moves towards the center of the figure, continuing to loop once it has reached the fixed point.
In listing the basins of attraction below, I have suppressed basins of attraction rotationally equivalent to those displayed. Notice that in the prisoner's dilemma played on a five-person ring, the state with two adjacent defectors is stable. Because there are five such attracting states 15 equivalent under rotation, I omit these since they do not count as a qualitatively different basin of attraction. Hence the number of states included in each figure does not equal the total number of possible states for the RBN.
need to use the algorithm described in Wuensche (1994) , which is capable of handling arbitrary random boolean networks. 15 1 and 2 defect, all others cooperate; 2 and 3 defect, all others cooperate; 3 and 4 defect, all others cooperate; 4 and 5 defect, all others cooperate; and 5 and 1 defect, all others cooperate. 
